Members can make the recording capacity of the use dependent. However, the actual use of a trademark cannot be considered a precondition for filing a registration application and, after that filing date, it must be at least three years before non-compliance with an intention to use is allowed as a reason for rejecting the application (Article 14.3). In practice, the purpose of WTO-authorized exemptions varies considerably. Some exceptions raised trade policy issues, such as the famous dispute between the European Communities at the time and several Latin American countries over the banana trade. Others concerned unilateral preferential trade regimes or matters of public interest, in particular the exemption for the Kimberley certification system for rough diamonds, adopted in 2003, which aims to combat the trade in blood diamonds and has been regularly renewed. In the past, there have also been exceptions under the TRIPS agreement, including the 2003 waiver, which eventually became article 31 bis mentioned above. This pressure, which can be bilateral (for example. B under U.S. Trade Representative Special Procedure 301) or multilateral (smaller competing trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), has multiplied in recent years due to an effective failure of the WTO negotiations, which halted further progress in their last round of negotiations, the Doha Development Round. The ON TRIPS agreement is a minimum model agreement that allows members to more broadly protect intellectual property protection on demand. Members are free to determine the appropriate method of transposing the provisions of the agreement into their own legal and practical order.
In addition to the basic intellectual property standards set out in the TRIPS agreement, many nations have committed to bilateral agreements to adopt a higher level of protection. This collection of standards, known as TRIPS or TRIPS-Plus, can take many forms.  Among the general objectives of these agreements are: the TRIPS agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from 1986 to 1994. Its reception was the culmination of an intensive lobbying program by the United States, supported by the European Union, Japan and other developed nations. Campaigns of unilateral economic support under the system of generalized preferences and the constraint under Section 301 of the Trade Act have played an important role in combating competing political positions favoured by developing countries such as Brazil, but also Thailand, India and the Caribbean basin countries.